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This paper compares and contrasts the regime changes in Georgia (2003) and Kyrgyzstan
(2005) that resulted in the overthrow of Presidents Shevardnadze and Akaev and are often 
considered to be part of a common ‘coloured revolution’ phenomenon in the post-Soviet 
space. This article sheds light on the factors that contributed to the rise of successful 
opposition movements that dislodged the ruling regimes. In particular, the paper will 
challenge two popular views that, in turn, exaggerate the influence of foreign actors in the 
Rose and Tulip Revolutions, and over-estimate the unity of purpose among the main 
opposition parties. The paper is based primarily on primary sources and interviews 
conducted in both Georgia and Kyrgyzstan since 2001. 
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Introduction
Parliamentary elections in Georgia on 2 November 2003, and in Kyrgyzstan on 27 February and 
13 March 2005, were the catalyst for the overthrow of two of the best-known post-soviet 
presidents, Eduard Shevardnadze and Askar Akaev. Shevardnadze’s decision to falsify elections 
in 2003, which many suspected was designed to preserve his position beyond 2005, when he was 
constitutionally obliged to step down, proved a politically fatal mistake. Credible opposition 
leaders were in place and these combined with a plethora of non-state actors to inspire and 
mobilize tens of thousands to protest in the streets, ultimately leading to Shevardnadze’s 
premature departure from office. In Kyrgyzstan the large crowds assembled to challenge the 
election results, although never reaching the levels witnessed in Kyiv and Tbilisi, were mainly to 
be found in peripheral towns and cities in the south and took the form of a popular uprising, 
temporarily displacing government officials and structures with ‘revolutionary’ ones. When 
Akaev went ahead and opened the new parliament on 22 March he was quickly dislodged from 
the ‘White House’ (the seat of government) by an angry mob and soon found himself on a plane 
to Moscow and political obscurity.
In this essay I identify the factors that influenced the timing and nature of the anti-regime efforts 
in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan that culminated in what are known as the Rose and Tulip revolutions. 
I inspect the role that political elites and personalities played in the unfolding dramas and evaluate 
the extent to which the media, youth groups and regional power bases  helped or hindered the 
anti-government struggle. More specifically, I challenge two assumptions popular among analysts 
of the coloured revolution phenomenon. The first of these is the argument that opposition unity 
was a prerequisite for the presidents’ overthrow : as will become clear, opposition parties found it 
too difficult to coordinate their actions and their leaders could not agree how best to challenge the 
election results. The second is the contention that the Rose and Tulip revolutions were 
orchestrated by Western agencies that sought to induce a change of government so as to further 
US interests in the region. 
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The Regimes
As has been pointed out elsewhere, revolutionaries rarely make revolutions, governments do.1 
Shevardnadze’s Georgia and Akaev’s Kyrgyzstan fell considerably short of strong post-soviet 
authoritarian states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. Whether we call them partial democracies, 
hybrid democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes, the Georgian and Kyrgyz states never 
monopolized politics. For Eduard Shevardnadze, the years immediately after 1991 were perhaps 
the most challenging and successful in his long and varied career. When he arrived in Tbilisi in 
March 1992, there was no legitimate government, only chaos and gunfire in the streets. Within 
two years, Georgia became an internationally recognized state with a constitution, a functioning 
parliament, and relatively fair and free elections. He proved no better than his predecessor Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia in tackling the thorny issue of secessionism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
although he had demonstrated considerable personal valour by travelling to Sukhumi, the Abkhaz 
capital, at the height of the war and staying until the end of hostilities. By the end of the 1990s 
Shevardnadze was no longer a positive force in Georgian politics. Having put the institutions of 
the state in place he fell back on his instincts and skills, honed during the Brezhnev years, of 
managing people rather than implementing policy. In November 2003, on the eve of the 
revolution, Shevardnadze was 75 years old and constitutionally obliged to step down when his 
term ended in 2005. He did not relish conversations on this subject, however. ‘Trying to talk to 
Shevardnadze four times in 2003 about what his future plans would be after his term ended’, one 
of his closest advisors recalls, ‘was like committing suicide four times’. 2 Many suspected that 
Shevardnadze would devise some way of preserving his interests and influence, perhaps by 
making constitutional changes and appointing a loyal successor.3
The United States and several European countries, particularly Germany, had generously 
supported Shevardnadze, and this was complemented by aid from international organizations 
aimed at facilitating democratization efforts in Georgia. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, Georgia 
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was one of the largest recipients of US aid per capita in the world. After the 2000 elections, 
however, there was a noticeable dampening of enthusiasm for Shevardnadze in the West, 
although important military assistance was given to help Georgia meet  challenges in the Pankiski 
gorge.4 In 2003, however, the US announced funding cuts and the International Monetary Fund 
declared that it was suspending assistance to the Shevardnadze government.5 Funding for non-
governmental organizations in Georgia remained constant.
In Kygyzstan, President Akaev, a politician by accident, had liberal instincts, reinforced by his 
country’s lack of natural resources. Surrounded by poor or unfriendly states and with no oil to sell 
to the West, Akaev decided early on that his best bet was to offer America a democratic success 
story. With a range of progressive legislation introduced in the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan achieved 
a string of notable firsts in the Commonwealth of Independent States: it was the first state to 
privatize land, the first to break with the rouble and establish its own currency (1993), and the 
first to join the World Trade Organization (1998). Like Shevardnadze, had Akaev stepped down 
in 2000 he might have done so with a little gratitude and some applause, but his decision to seek 
another term sullied his liberal reputation. By this stage, Akaev had engineered a series of 
constitutional changes that had augmented his powers, and his family members had greatly 
enriched themselves. Far from becoming the ‘Switzerland of Central Asia’, as Akaev had once 
boasted, Kyrgyzstan had simply indulged in  many of the excesses characteristic of other Central 
Asian executives, breeding a corrupt elite parasitically living off an impoverished and politically 
impotent citizenry. Like Shevardnadze before him, Akaev had attracted substantial international 
acclamation and funding only to see both evaporate shortly after the 2000 presidential election as 
it became clear that the regime had turned into merely a corrupt oligarchy. The greed of Akaev’s 
family and allied clans grew as the economy declined. By the end, Akaev had lost the support of 
democrats, the intelligentsia and the south, and was increasingly beholden to a narrow stratum of 
northern clans. However, like Shevardnadze, Akaev managed to deflect the worst of the odium to 
his closest associates. Many believed that, while Akaev himself was a fundamentally decent 
person, he was unable to control the excesses of his wife, his children, and political hangers-on.6
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In both countries there existed a general sense that the national interest was being pawned or sold 
to the highest bidder. The sale of Georgia’s gas-distribution network to the Russian United 
Energy Systems in 2003 aroused criticism.7 Although the sale was occasioned by the American–
Georgian company AES Telasi’s desire to raise cash quickly by ridding itself of a troublesome 
investment, the Georgian government was blamed for failing to step in and purchase a controlling 
share.8 As the sale came hot on the heels of Shevardnadze’s consent to a 25-year ‘strategic co-
operation’ agreement with Russia’s Gazprom, oppositionists portrayed the Shevardnadze regime 
as either falling back on Russian support to compensate for waning Western approval, or selling 
off Georgia’s national interests simply to stay in power. Shevardnadze’s failure to make headway 
on Abkhazia and South Ossetia was also increasingly attributed to indifference to the national 
good, which was secondary to managing and maintaining power. Akaev was similarly under fire, 
particularly in the south, for agreeing to transfer Kyrgyz territories, 90,000 hectares in all, to 
China. The presence of both US and Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, while extolled as 
profitable pragmatism, was also viewed by some as  political prostitution. 
Ultimately both the Shevardnadze and the Akaev regimes fell not just because of determined 
efforts by the opposition, but also because of a lack of will among key state institutions to 
withstand attack or to defend the regime adequately. The government’s unwillingness to use 
maximum force against the protesters was a crucial ingredient in the opposition’s recipe for 
revolution. According to Ghia Nodia, Shevardnadze may not have been ideologically wedded to 
the non-violence  but could not bring himself to use force  when it might have been effective:
He did not want to use force; he counted on that. But as these protests continued and as 
time passed they gained strength rather than diminished strength – his plan crumbled 
because of that … morale in the government was eroded, more and more people started to 
switch sides … After being ousted from parliament I believe he was ready finally, 
psychologically ready, to use force but by that stage he simply did not have force to use. 
It was too late.9
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Having seen security around parliament melt, Shevardnadze went for one last throw of the dice by 
declaring a state of emergency, but by then he could not command the loyalty of the security 
apparatus. Police units were defecting to the opposition in large numbers, creating potential for 
civil conflict had Shevardnadze not resigned promptly. 
The Tulip revolution followed the Georgian script with a Kyrgyz twist. Although police or army 
violence could never be entirely ruled out in Kyrgyzstan – these forces had, after all, killed six 
protesters in the southern town of Aksy in 2002 – few believed that Akaev would embark on a 
bloody defensive campaign to stay in power. Akaev himself had ruled out the use of force to quell 
the protests and as late as 20 March the Kyrgyz prime minister, Nikolai Tanaev, assured the 
public that law-enforcers sent to retake government buildings in the south did not carry 
weapons.10 In an effort to avoid bloodshed, Akaev had refused to declare a state of emergency, 
perhaps because he  could not have relied on the entire security apparatus. Unlike Shevardnadze, 
or Kuchma in Ukraine, the question of Akaev staying in the country after the revolution was off 
the negotiating table and Kyrgyzstan’s first president is condemned to a life in exile, raising the 
stakes for other post-soviet autocrats. Most importantly, perhaps, after the storming of the White 
House, Bishkek was convulsed in an orgy of violence and looting that left three dead and much of  
the commercial districts damaged. Foreign shops, particularly Turkish, were targeted and the 
process took on an unpleasant ethnic appearance as Russians and other minorities were 
intimidated.11 Whether one interprets this as anarchy engineered by pro-Akaev elements (as some 
opposition figures argued) or a collective venting of pent-up anger, it damaged the image of the 
revolution and indicated that a qualitatively different process was at play from that experienced in 
Georgia and Ukraine. 
Youth Groups
Youth organizations have achieved disproportionate attention in analyses of colour revolutions 
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partly because they symbolize radical endeavour and are alive to inventive means of  diffusing  
ideas across borders.12  Modelled on Serbia’s Otpor (Resistance), Georgia’s Kmara (Enough!):  
adopted a confrontational, often tongue-in-cheek, style of campaigning, and its high-profile stunts 
disguised its modest membership.14 Formal youth movements were far less prominent in 
Kyrgyzstan and did not play a decisive role in events.15 In January 2005, Kel-Kel (Renaissance) 
was formed, with the modest objective of ensuring free and fair elections; but even at the height 
of the election campaign Kel-Kel leaders claimed no more than 300 members, mostly Bishkek 
university students of whom only a small percentage were very active.16 A more radical group, 
Birge (Together), broke from Kel-Kel at the end of February 2005 but  had only 20 activists, all in 
the capital. 17 In what must rank as one of the most bizarre tactics devised to counter a coloured 
revolution, the Akaev regime manufactured a pro-government youth group also called Kel-Kel 
within two days of the ‘real’ Kel-Kel’s foundation. The clone proceeded to adopt the same 
slogans, symbols and website (which was duly given to them) but articulated a different political 
message. The Akaev regime had studied the rise of similar youth movements in Serbia, Georgia 
and Ukraine and concluded that they should be nipped in the bud. 
Media
The independent media have received particular mention as influential actors in facilitating 
coloured revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, although their impact, while undoubtedly 
significant, is difficult to quantify accurately. At the time of the Rose revolution there were 
numerous low-circulation newspapers in Georgia of varying (though generally low) quality. 
Television had (and continues to have) a far greater impact, and Shevardnadze’s failed attempts to 
tame the Rustavi 2 station underlined his weakness and vulnerability to popular disapproval.18
During the demonstrations, Rustavi 2 abandoned most pretences of objectivity, and through a 
series of coded messages appeared to embrace the opposition protesters. It advertised in advance 
the times and places when opposition meetings were to take place, and initially did its best to 
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magnify the number of protesters (although this was counterbalanced by state televisions attempts 
to do the opposite). During the demonstrations the station broadcasted ‘Bringing Down a 
Dictator’, a documentary on Otpor’s campaign in Serbia to topple Slobodan Milošević and, in 
case the message was insufficiently clear the first time, repeated the airing a few days later. 
Moreover, ample time was given to opposition leaders to present their case on Rustavi 2, and the 
station commissioned the damaging exit polls that quickly undermined confidence in the 
elections. 
Kyrgyzstan had no television station supporting the opposition; most people relied on state or 
Russian television for information. In the run-up to the March 2005 elections, state television did 
make repeated reference to the coloured revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine but (unlike Rustavi 
2’s endorsement of the Serbian model) they presented these events as regrettable lapses from 
order and a curse on the peoples who had been forced to endure them.19 Whereas, in Georgia, 
Kmara was able to broadcast political advertisements that ended with the call ‘Shevardnadze, you 
are the disease, get out!’,20 the situation in Kyrgyzstan was radically different, as one opposition 
leader explained during the election campaign:
They [State TV] show this clip of me speaking at a rally and then cut to a scene of a 
peasant who is milking a cow, a mother with a child, it’s a very poor house, rural, 
peaceful life, they should be very happy that they are doing this, poor peasant enjoying 
simple life, and then there is this loud voice at a rally coming on and they look worried … 
and so then the milk is spilt, the child starts crying, and you ask what is disturbing this 
stable life. And this is the objective. After seeing this for the only time – my mother, 
father, and I – we said ‘of course, people want you to stay at home and live a poor simple 
life’. This is the idea that they want to promote; that the citizen is someone who tends to 
his daily chores, who thinks about his piece of bread and little else.21
There was diversity in the Kyrgyzstani print media, but in the last year of his term Akaev put 
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enormous pressure on the three major independent newspapers, largely in the form of crippling 
libel cases.22 Freedom House had stepped in to print the papers when they faced boycott from 
state publishers, but even this manoeuvre was thwarted during the election when Freedom House 
found its electricity cut off for much of the campaign.23 In sum, the Georgia media played a 
critical role in framing the issue of electoral fraud and mobilizing the public while in Kyrgyzstan 
the state monopolized television and muzzled opposition newspapers.
Opposition Unity
Opposition unity is almost always cited as a fundamental prerequisite for a revolution of the type 
seen in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, be it called ‘electoral’ or ‘coloured’. In their article, ‘Favourable 
Conditions and Electoral Revolutions’, Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik cite the 
formation of a unified opposition as the first prerequisite for an electoral revolution.24 Mark 
Bessinger also states that a ‘united opposition established in part by foreign prodding’ is a basic 
requirement.25 Taking the example of Serbia, Marlene Spoerri argues that the formation of a 
united opposition coalition was a sine qua non for the toppling of Miloševic in 2000.26 Michael 
McFaul makes an important qualification when he states that ‘a united opposition – or at least the 
perception of one – is a … factor that appears crucial for democratic breakthrough’.27 This is a 
more modest estimation of the importance of opposition unity, and one that fits more comfortably 
with any explanation of the Rose and Tulip revolutions when a multitude of opposition leaders 
vied with each other and where the parties were generally weak, fragmented, disunited and 
personality-driven.
The lack of opposition unity in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan can partly be explained by the fact that 
candidates were running in parliamentary and not presidential elections, as was the case in the 
elections that led to the Serbian Bulldozer Revolution and Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Whereas 
a unified candidate against an unpopular incumbent could be presented as a necessity in a winner-
takes-all presidential contest, the same could not be argued for parliamentary elections. Parties 
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could co-operate but not step aside and could collaborate only to the extent that this did not 
diminish their popularity, confuse their hard-core constituency, or compromise their party’s 
longer-term interests.
The Georgian election did not offer a decisive victory to any opposition party, and, contrary to 
subsequent mythologizing, the opposition had not united prior to the election. This was not for 
want of attempts to get the opposition parties to co-operate with one another, particularly by the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), an influential American NGO. However, key elements 
within the opposition did unite after reports of election fraud filtered out and there was a 
coordinated protest engineered by Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement and the Bujanadze 
Democrats, which included Nino Burjanadze, Zurab Zhvania and Akaki Asatiani.28 It is necessary 
to point out, however, that some important parties remained aloof and even attended the opening 
session of the disputed parliament.
The groups that emerged from the flawed 2003 elections can be put into three categories. The first 
comprised the parties willing to take to the streets to protest against the voter fraud; these were 
Saakashvili’s National Movement and the Burjanadze Democrats. The US funded parallel vote 
tabulation (PVT), generally considered the most accurate estimation of the real vote, gave them a 
combined share of 37 per cent of the vote. In the second category, Shevardnadze’s ‘For A New 
Georgia’ and its allies (including Aslan Abashidze’s ‘Revival’ and ‘Industry Will Save Georgia’) 
received less than a third of the vote (32 per cent) and stood to lose most from the election.29 The 
third group consisted of those oppositionists, such as the Labour and New Rights parties, that 
opposed the Shevardnadze regime but whose leaderships did not support the protests against the 
election.
According to the PVT, the National Movement won just over a quarter of the vote. Had none of 
the other opposition parties united with Saakashvili he would have been left with not a national 
mission to save Georgia for democracy but a desire to preserve his own rightful share of the vote 
– a far less inspiring rallying call. In this sense, the addition of the Burjanadze Democrats to the 
protest campaign gave a lifeline without which it is unlikely that the Rose Revolution would have 
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developed as a mass event. An alternative scenario would have been for the National Movement 
simply to appeal through the courts, having some district level recounts, improving their 
representation slightly but lacking the momentum that led to Shevardnadze’s departure. Without 
the Burjanadze Democrats support, all opposition party leaderships would have demurred from 
protesting on the streets, except the National Movement (a fact that could have been attributed to 
Saakashvili’s emotionalism or inability to compromise). Also, it would have implied that a 
majority of the opposition, in terms of the stance taken by their leaders and the party vote 
estimated by the PVT, did not support the protests; this would have made it impossible for 
Saakashvili and his National Movement to claim to represent the national will against a decaying 
autocracy. More important, it may be argued, was the coming on board of Zhvania and 
Burjanadze rather than their parties. Georgian political parties are almost always constructed 
around strong personalities rather than institutionalized organizations, solid membership, ideology 
or cleavage. Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze were probably the best known and most 
popular opposition personalities. Personal rivalries and different outlooks prevented Shalva 
Natelashvili and David Gamkrelidze, leaders of the Labour and New Rights parties respectively, 
from joining the protests although they were out of step with much of their support base on this 
issue.30
Therefore, if we are to take the PVT as accurate, the protesting opposition represented less than 
40 per cent. At the last moment, the New Rights Party, which had announced that it would join 
the parliamentary boycott, made a secret pact with Shevardnadze and most of its elected 
representatives rushed to parliament to provide the quota necessary for opening the disputed 
legislature .31 The lack of opposition unity can partially be attributed to Shevardnadze’s stature as 
the dominant political figure in Georgia since 1972, a survivor who seemed politically immortal. 
Not all were willing to confront him at this time and many were jockeying for position in 
anticipation of the presidential contest that was due in just over a year. 
Opposition parties in Kyrgyzstan were, by the eve of Akaev’s removal, reasonably united on 
paper but this meant comparatively little in practice given their structural flaws, not least in terms
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of membership and organization. To a much greater extent than in Georgia, Kyrgyz political 
parties were devoid of ideological underpinning. In Kyrgyzstan politics divided not on a left–right 
but on a north–south basis. Moreover, while there were many parties there were not many party 
members: in 1995, in the whole of Kyrgyzstan, only 13,000 citizens were members of a political 
party.32 Parliamentary representation was also notable for the preponderance of ‘independents’ 
elected, which some commentators attributed in part to the electoral law that made no provision 
for party lists while permitting independents to stand for election. Moreover, a revised electoral 
law, introduced under international pressure and designed to give parties more representation, did 
little to reverse this trend and at the March 2000 elections independents secured 73 of the places 
in the 105-seat legislature (69.6 per cent). Without a party, independent deputies enjoyed freedom 
of action and were not subjected to the normal rigours of party life, such as discipline, collective 
responsibility, or the need to devise policies on national issues. Akaev reinforced this trend by 
never making a serious effort to establish a ruling party that would represent the president’s 
platform, put it before the electorate and seek endorsement. He too contested the 1995 presidential 
election as an independent and the fact that he ran a well-organized and -publicized campaign 
without the support of a party machine illustrates how politics was conducted in Kyrgyzstan prior 
to the Tulip revolution. Local notables realized that access to power would not be achieved 
through political parties with their formal rules, transparent structures and open membership: 
rather, influence would be secured through patronage networks, and a place in parliament or close 
to the president was considered preferable to working through a party organization – it was more 
lucrative and less transparent and no accountability was required except to one’s own kin and 
allies. Thus parliamentarians relied on their clan networks rather than party organizations to 
propel them to power. For those outside the clan networks, politics seemed particularly futile. 
Parties lacked a popular base and real power lay with the regional groups; but, while one could 
join an open party, the same did not necessarily apply to kin-based clans. These realties were also 
reflected in turnout; in the Russified and individualistic capital of Bishkek turnout hovered at the 
60 per cent mark, whereas clan-dominated regions could engineer figures of more than 90 per 
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cent.33
Kyrgyz parties were unable to serve as the vital link between state and citizen. They fulfilled few 
of the duties normally associated with political parties; as one commentator lamented ‘they cannot 
conduct negotiations with the government, can’t work with the population, do not have the trust 
of the people, and do not have a strategy’.34 In the 2005 elections, as before, prospective 
candidates spent large amounts on securing legislative seats as these were seen as vital means of 
protecting existing interests and accumulating new ones. They were often government officials or 
‘businessmen’, a nebulous concept in Kyrgyzstan that hinted at shady dealings and ill-gotten 
gains. Kyrgyzstani opposition figures made attempts to coordinate their efforts, but in such a 
political environment talk of ‘opposition unity’ meant little as the opposition did not represent a 
large section of the electorate. On 10 March, several notables including Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
Azimbek Beknazarov and Ishengul Boljurova came together to form a common front, but the 
alliance was of personalities rather than parties and played a negligible role in the dismissal of 
Akaev.35 The north–south unity team of Bakiev and Feliks Kulov was a marriage of convenience 
that later ended in an acrimonious divorce, and by 2007 many  of the most prominent members of 
the fragile opposition coalition hastily convened in March 2005 had defected to opposition 
politics. 
The Role of the West
Where Georgians saw roses, Moscow could only see the thorns, while what took shape on the 
streets of Bishkek looked less like a tulip than a weed. Most of the post-soviet elites were hostile 
to the coloured revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, condemned what they argued 
were American-backed coups d’état, and delivered sermons on the criminal injustice of ‘foreign 
intervention’.36 Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the revolutions to be acts of ‘political 
technology’ skilfully managed by the West. Russian analysts weighed in with critical evaluations: 
small numbers of professional revolutionaries had supposedly been trained with the sole intention 
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of artificially fermenting political upheaval while giving the false impression that such revolts 
were spontaneous and enjoyed popular support (obvious comparisons to Leninist revolutionary 
tactics generally escaped these writers). According to this view, these ‘manufactured 
democracies’ were merely a cover for more sinister motives, and aimed generally at extending US 
influence over the CIS. It is a position also supported by some of the coloured revolutions’ chief 
victims such as Aslan Abashidze and Askar Akaev. The Kyrgyz authorities presented George 
Soros, a frequent visitor to Kyrgyzstan and former ally of Akaev in the 1990s, as a bogeyman 
inciting mawkish youth to rebellion.37 Moreover, in an interview given shortly after his removal 
from office Akaev said that, whereas Russia and China had always contributed to Central Asian 
security and adopted a policy of non-intervention in internal affairs, the same could not be said of 
the Western powers: 
As for the West’s influence [on the 24 March events] – this was obvious and it was no 
secret to anyone … Over the last year in Kyrgyzstan … much work was carried out by
numerous international organizations to set in motion the technology of a coloured 
revolution, so, of course, the prevailing factor here was precisely the West’s influence and 
it prompted the instructors from Ukraine and Georgia, people who already had experience 
in carrying out an orange [and] a rose revolution, to call in on us. So, my view remains 
the same; it was the outside factor, the West, of course, and first and foremost the USA.38
Shevardnadze also lent credibility to the conspiracy theory that Western actors were out to 
manufacture regime-change when, during the Rose revolution protests, he publicly blamed 
George Soros for the course of events. While admitting some shortcomings in the electoral 
process, Shevardnadze continued by asking: ‘but why are international forces getting involved? 
What does Soros want? I am declaring a categorical protest against the actions of Soros’.39
Moreover, shortly after he was overthrown Shevardnadze attributed his downfall to a combination 
of the NDI, Soros and US embassy officials ‘who had a particular mission to accomplish’, 
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lamenting that ‘the Yugoslav scenario was played out here’.40 Although the Georgian president 
was a figure of hatred for many in Russia and held responsible for the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, a consensus emerged in the Kremlin that the Rose revolution represented a defeat for 
Russian power in the region and resulted from a carefully orchestrated American conspiracy to 
install a more malleable regime in Tbilisi. Moreover, desperate for some good news in view of the 
deteriorating situation in Iraq, the White House in Washington quickly claimed ownership of the 
revolutions. Praising US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Wall Street Journal fancifully 
described Kyrgyzstan as the latest state to join ‘the global march of freedom led by President 
Bush’.41 Articles appeared in the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune, which 
argued that US aid for Kyrgyz NGOs and media had been a decisive factor.42 The US 
Ambassador Stephen Young’s immediate welcoming of Akaev’s overthrow – ‘the United States 
is proud to have assisted the process’ – further fuelled suspicions of an American master plan, as 
did a joint message to the Kyrgyz people by the presidents of Georgia and Ukraine.43
Certainly, Akaev’s departure aroused jubilation among key American-funded NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan, including the National Democratic Institute and the Soros Foundation, but this 
confirmed their political leanings not their role in removing Akaev.44 Let us consider briefly how, 
and to what extent, Western actors supported efforts that contributed to the political and electoral 
processes in both countries. During the first 13 years of Kyrgyzstan’s independence (1992–2005), 
the country received almost $800 million in US aid, $120.7 million of which took the form of 
grants for NGOs.45 While the focus had perhaps naturally concentrated on funding for 
independent media and civil and human rights, it should be stressed that it also included funds for 
NGOs devoted to less overtly political issues such as the environment, children and pensioners. In 
the year prior to the revolution, the Freedom Support Act spent $12m on democracy programmes 
out of a total US aid package of $50.8 million.46 Bakiev and Kulov, among others, had been 
brought to the US on American programmes. Rosa Otunbaeva, a darling of the West, was a 
former ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom, and immediately prior to the 
election had been deputy head of the UN mission to Georgia. The Americans had also been 
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heavily involved in the election process. The US government had spent $170,000 through the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to provide the equipment necessary for 
‘marking’ fingertips (mainly ink and ultraviolet lights) to all 1,300 polling districts and for the 
training of polling station officials. A further $320,000 was provided to train local election 
commission members, $100,000 to train local observers, and $300,000 to disseminate voter 
education literature through local NGOs and media outlets.47 The US government also paid for 75 
Kyrgyz citizens to go to Ukraine for the 2004 presidential elections as part of a mission led by 
Edil Baisalov.48
For many years Georgia had the distinction of being the largest per capita recipient of US aid after 
Israel. America received ever-diminishing returns, as corruption thrived and democratization was 
exposed as a platitude designed to attract aid rather than  a real government objective. As a result, 
six weeks before the 2003 elections the US government announced that it would be cutting aid, on 
grounds of insufficient  reforms in Georgia.49 A myriad of foreign-funded NGOs undermined 
Shevardnadze’s credibility; among them the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Liberty 
Institute were particularly active, the later subsequently providing some capable figures for 
Saakashvili’s administration. The Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF, also known as the 
Soros Foundation) was a prominent supporter of independent media and NGOs: it provided 
money for the independent TV channel Rustavi 2 in its early days and a related newspaper 24 
Saati (24 Hours). It organized trips to Belgrade for the Liberty Institute, opposition leaders and 
the youth movement Kmara The head of OSGF, Kakha Lomia, went to Belgrade in February 
2003 with other NGO activists to reinforce links between Georgian and Serbian civil society 
actors. The OSGF administered an election support programme with a budget of $300,000 to fund 
a number of election-related activities, including ‘get out the vote’ programmes and voter 
education, and grants for civil society actors.50 It also provided money to Rustavi 2 to conduct 
vital exit polls.
The idea of a Soros–Bush joint conspiracy is difficult to reconcile with the largesse dispensed by 
the Hungarian billionaire to unseat George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential contest, which took 
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place between the revolutions. It should also be remembered that during the 1990s and beyond, 
Soros had no more receptive ears in the former USSR than those of Shevardnadze and Akaev.
Externally funded NGOs and other actors played a much smaller role in Kyrgyzstan than in 
Georgia and Ukraine, although much greater than in some other post-soviet countries such as 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. There was no strong correlation between NGO presence and anti-
Akaev protests, because most Western-funded NGOs were based in the capital Bishkek and not in 
the rebellious south, the heartland of the Tulip revolution, where alternative institutions of 
administration were established to challenge the Akaev government.
Prominent activists and NGO leaders in Georgia reject the notion that the Rose revolution was a 
coup manufactured by the West, as the Liberty Institute director, Levan Ramishvili, explained:
It’s not only in Moscow [that this argument is popular]; it was also said in some Western 
media outlets. It reminds me of Soviet propaganda; when everything that was not 
controlled by the Kremlin and by the Politburo was perceived as a CIA plot. It’s maybe 
some sort of racism; that only white people in western Europe can be the initiators of 
democratic peaceful revolution, that we in this part of the world just can kill each other 
and if something happens that means it was somehow imported because we intellectually 
can somehow not handle this, because we are too stupid to be democratic agents.51
The director of the Soros Foundation in Georgia, Kakha Lomia, also rejects the Russian view that 
his organization, in alliance with the US government, plotted to overthrow Shevardnadze. He 
attributes the popularity of this view to Russia’s sense of loss after the Rose Revolution and its 
fear that Georgia was leaving the Kremlin orbit. ‘They were looking for someone to blame’, 
Lomia argues ‘and the most convenient target was Soros, a mythological figure in their 
understanding who was ousted from the Russian Federation, from Uzbekistan, from Belarus, and 
from Serbia’. In Lomia’s view, to blame Soros or ‘the West’ is a way of denying agency to 
Georgians, since to suggest otherwise would mean that ‘they would have to admit that the major 
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driving force behind these events was the Georgian people … so I think that was their primitive 
way of underestimating the power of the people’.52
Rather than being the sites of some grand American strategy for regime change – a softer, better-
packaged, version of the forced democratization projects in Iraq and Afghanistan – the truth was 
more mundane. In Georgia, the US government adopted a cautious approach throughout the crisis. 
Until the end, the US embassy in Tbilisi had identified its role as that of mediator between 
Shevardnadze and the opposition. Indeed, according to one well-placed observer, the US 
ambassador ‘tried to calm down the revolutionaries and stop them from being too radical’.53 All 
the Americans demanded was free and fair elections, but, since the regime did not intend to grant 
them, US involvement appeared a blatant endorsement of the opposition. Similarly, NDI’s 
training sessions for political parties were unwelcome not because they excluded pro-government 
parties (they did not) but simply because the government, with its administrative resources, 
needed assistance least and such training therefore disproportionately benefited opposition parties. 
In Kyrgyzstan, no clear alternative to Akaev was evident; what had presented itself was an 
amalgam of different personalities and interests, and it was not clear who would prevail in a post-
Akaev scenario. The fear of social and political meltdown should not be underestimated. Free and 
fair elections were one thing, but not at the price of state collapse and resulting anarchy and 
chaos. 
What the ‘West’, broadly defined, certainly did in the run-up to the historic elections was provide 
modest assistance to a relatively small group of organizations with a remit to bolster civil society, 
strengthen social capital, and promote transparency, accountability and fairness in government 
and in the electoral process.54 They failed almost entirely in the latter objective. Government in 
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan was more corrupt and less democratic on the eve of the revolutions than 
a decade earlier despite vast sums of money provided to the Shevardnadze and Akaev regimes.55
Western displeasure with increasing authoritarianism was reflected in declining financial support 
for both regimes after 2000. American funding was increasingly diverted to NGOs, considered a 
more effective way of distributing aid and achieving results. However, the regimes still received 
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substantial assistance from the West, not least because of their strategic importance. Earlier in 
2003, Shevardnadze immediately signed Georgia up for America’s ‘coalition of the willing’, 
while Kyrgyzstan was home to a US military base, an integral part of its operations in 
Afghanistan. It is also largely forgotten that, during the election campaign, Akaev received a 
significant boost by having a large part of Kyrgyzstan’s debt written off by the Paris Club.56
Outraged oppositionists contrasted the critical evaluations of Akaev’s reign with this concrete 
support and accused the West of hypocrisy, of propping up a dictator. Just over a week before 
Akaev’s toppling, a patently frustrated chief political editor of Kyrgyzstan’s main opposition 
paper put the case as follows: 
Every two or three months there have been delegations from the European Union, the 
European Commission [and] OSCE and during our meetings with these people I would 
say ‘you are just political tourists’ … In fact, they [the West] compensate whatever the 
[Akaev] family doesn’t pay as tax. We need to maintain our teachers, pensioners and all 
the social sections with our taxes but whenever taxes are paid, it is a very small figure. An 
example: the president writes a programme to fight poverty, European countries are asked 
for money to help fight poverty, and no one says ‘let your [Akaev’s] children pay taxes’ 
… I am tired of explaining this to people from Europe and the United States – everybody 
who comes here. … However, they do not want to think about these issues and think we 
are exaggerating. That is why this year we are going to have blood in our country because 
the international community could have prevented that but didn’t want to do anything.57
The argument here, therefore, is that it was Western neglect of democracy promotion and not 
Western intervention that caused the revolutions. To compensate for the lack of credible evidence 
of Western espionage, and prove the existence of foreign intrigues, unconventional initiatives 
were taken. One of the most bizarre was a memorandum reputed to have been composed by the 
US ambassador to Kyrgyzstan for his colleagues back in Washington, DC.58 The document 
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described Akaev as ‘a protégé of Russia … guided by Moscow’, and went on to advocate that tens 
of millions be spent on promoting the interests pof romising opposition personalities such as 
Bakiev, Kulov and Otunbaeva whose interests and outlook allegedly converged with those of 
America. The embassy’s primary objective would be to sow distrust in the authorities, inspire 
riots and manipulate young people the better to ‘popularize the American way of life among them 
[and] diminish Russian influence’. The document was circulated on 19 March, as protests reached 
a climax, and was hailed as proof that the US was plotting to overthrow Akaev. Although the 
substandard English used in the memo suggested that the authors were more likely connected to 
the White House in Bishkek than to that in Washington, DC, many ardently but unconvincingly 
defended its authenticity. 
Finally, the allure of Europe for Georgia should be noted. Georgia was admitted to the Council of 
Europe in 1999, which was interpreted by Georgians as recognition of their rightful place in 
Europe.59 It was Zurab Zhvania who had coined the phrase ‘I am Georgian, therefore I am 
European’, which according to one seasoned observer formed ‘the core of the anti-Shevardnadze 
opposition … the major outcome of the revolution is that Georgians have started to feel European 
again’.60 The velvet revolution was, after all, associated with Central and Eastern Europe, and by 
executing a mass non-violent revolution, Georgians had shed the sense that they were a people 
incapable of resolving their differences peacefully. This re-entry to Europe was symbolized by a 
new flag that stressed Georgia’s Christian character with not one but no fewer than five crosses of 
Saint George. The EU flag is flown throughout Tbilisi, including outside all major government 
institutions.61 Understandably, the European factor played little role in motivating activists in 
Kyrgyzstan. The country was in a rather dangerous neighbourhood and prior to the Tulip 
revolution many key opposition figures believed that the Kyrgyzstan could not go the way of 
Georgia and Ukraine owing to it geographical position. [interviews with Rina Prijivoit and 
Mambet Abylov cited in footnotes]
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Regional Factors
In his important contribution to understanding the diffusion of the coloured revolutions, Mark 
Bessinger maintains that Georgia and Kyrgyzstan (along with Ukraine) possess ‘strong regional 
dimensions within the dominant cultural group’. He elaborates: ‘In Georgia the major base for the 
opposition was in Western Georgia in the area of Mingrelia – a region long associated with 
Georgian nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia and in which Shevardnadze had always been 
unpopular’.62 This exaggerates greatly the relevance of Mingrelia as a factor. True, Saakashvili 
has enjoyed higher than average support there but this cannot be compared to the east–west 
division in Ukraine or north–south in Kyrgyzstan. Other divisions in Georgia (apart from the 
separatist republics that claim no part in Georgian affairs) include the Armenian and Azeri 
populated regions (Samtskhe-Javakheti and parts of Kvemo Kartli respectively) in the south and 
east of the country and Adjara. The Armenian and Azeri populated regions always voted for the 
incumbent, with regional bosses delivering the vote. Adjara might constitute a regional division 
but for most of the time Abashidze separated himself from mainstream Georgian politics.  He 
toyed with the centre only with a view to acquiring dominance – not to become subordinate part 
of the larger entity (for Abashidze the existing status of de facto independence was preferable to 
closer integration with a Georgia he did not control). Abashidze’s role in the Rose revolution was 
as a crutch for Shevardnadze, but his support was personal rather than regional and did not reflect 
any expressed wish of the Adjaran citizenry.
While the regional aspect played a negligible role in Georgia’s Rose revolution, it was very 
influential in Kyrgyzstan where a numerous southern population harboured strong anti-Akaev 
sentiments. With their greater attachment to tradition, religion and language, many southern 
Kyrgyz had never felt close to Akaev, who hailed from the more liberal, secular and Russified 
north.63 These differences would probably not have become fatal to Akaev’s career had he not 
handed out the vast majority of plum posts to northerners and kept southern clans out of many of 
the most lucrative businesses. The sense of injustice provoked by this was exacerbated by the fact 
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that over half of Kyrgyzstan’s population resided in the south and Akaev’s key allies in the region 
were ethnic Uzbeks who preferred Akaev to a more nationalist alternative but were the object of 
suspicion and dislike among many southern Kyrgyz. Akaev had traditionally won support from 
those outside the clan rivalries within the Kyrgyz population. The most significant of these were 
the ethnic Russians, situated predominately in the north, the Uzbeks, the vast majority of whom 
lived in the southern Ferghana region that bordered Uzbekistan, and the Uyghurs. Each of these 
groups felt it had much to fear from a resurgent Kyrgyz nationalism and attached great 
significance to the ranting of local populists. Initially, Akaev had earned this support by 
successfully defending ethnic minorities against nationalistic forces and acting as a bulwark 
against discrimination. The importance of preserving inter-ethnic harmony  cannot be 
overestimated, as was illustrated by the 1990 Kyrgyz–Uzbek clashes in Osh  that left up to 300 
dead.65 Increasingly, however, Akaev’s support for ethnic minorities was rhetorical, his support 
symbolic rather than substantial, the threat more manufactured for personal gain than an accurate 
reflection of reality. By the same token, Uzbek and Russian support for Akaev became 
increasingly formal, more a case of choosing the lesser of two evils than signifying an enthusiastic 
endorsement. 
As his foothold in the north looked increasingly shaky, Akaev made token gestures towards the 
south by appointing a succession of southerners – although only those with weak clan ties – to the 
position of prime minister. Kurmanbek Bakiev was one such example, although he was eventually 
sacrificed to appease pubic outrage arising from the Aksy killings of 2002. It was a cruel irony 
that to appease southern anger at the killing of protesters in Aksy, the southerners lost ‘their’ 
prime minister. Bakiev was replaced by Nikolay Tanayev, an ethnic Russian born in Russia and 
therefore unlikely to have strong clan allegiances in Kyrgyzstan. In the final analysis, regionalism 
is an integral feature of Kyrgyzstan’s politics and played a decisive role in the overthrow of 
Akaev. By contrast, the strongest ethnic opponents of Shevardnadze’s regime, those in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, were not part of mainstream Georgian politics, and other potentially 
troublesome minorities had been domesticated. 
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The Role of Elites and Personalities
In the literature on coloured revolutions, there has been a marked tendency to focus on the actions 
of domestic elites. Henry Hale, for example, has advocated that rather than framing research in 
terms of transitions to democracy or autocracy or dwelling on hybrids in between, we should see 
events as ‘just one swing in a regular cyclical process’.66 For Hale the key is the presidential term, 
the observance of term limits and the intention of incumbents.67 If an incumbent president is 
stepping down, there will be uncertainty among the elite members who then jockey for position 
fearing the new dispensation will challenge their interests.68 With the high stakes in these winner-
takes-all contests, elites mobilize everything they can, and in such struggles all resources, 
including popular mobilization on the street, can be deployed. 
However, as has been argued here, the opposition elite could not unite against the regime, and 
some held out for a deal with Shevardnadze that would further their interests. The masses 
compensated for opposition disunity, a battering ram against the fortress of power without which 
opposition leaders would have been left howling at the moon. The crowds needed a coherent 
message and it was provided primarily by Mikheil Saakashvili who from an early stage called for 
Shevardnadze’s resignation. Both Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze readily confessed that the 
Rose Revolution would never have happened without the single-mindedness of Saakashvili, who 
from the first reports of electoral fraud correctly interpreted the popular mood and translated the 
sense of outrage into a demand that Shevarnadze must go. Up until the day Shevardnadze 
resigned, Zhvania and Burjanadze were willing to cut a deal with Shevardnadze that would have 
allowed him to stay in power in return for overturning the vote in key districts and demanding 
recounts. Indeed, Burjanadze also admits that she was practically forced by Saakashvili to declare 
herself acting president moments before Shevardnadze was due to open the new parliament. Ghia 
Nodia argues  that there should be  a ‘great man’ dimension to our understanding of the unfolding 
drama: 
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That’s how history is. Zhvania is not the type who can lead a revolution, Burjanadze is 
not the type who can lead a revolution; there should be some leader who leads the 
revolution. That’s why it was successful ... At turning points in history, I believe that 
[‘great man’] theory is true. Afterwards, when there is stabilization, sustainability, 
consolidation, that cannot just be explained by great men but at critical turning-points in 
landmark events everything is so uncertain and very small things can have very big 
results.69
Georgian politics had always been an arena of intrigue, rumours and constant jockeying for 
power, which often resulted in a plethora of fragile, ad hoc alliances. This court politics was not 
based on policy, and there was an excessive reliance on personalities who competed for inclusion 
in Shevardnadze’s inner circle. Saakashvili’s innovation did not lie in introducing new policies or 
taking a position on the left–right spectrum, for his National Movement was established as a 
catch-all party encompassing all classes and creeds. What separated Saakashvili was his style and 
political technique, much of which he learnt while in the United States. While minister for justice 
he published a book, ostensibly to outline his policies but in reality to introduce himself to the 
public as a man of vision. The title – The Decisive  Struggle for Georgia – gave a clue to the 
messianic persona of the author and the scale of his ambitions.70 His manner of departure from the 
cabinet after a mere ten months in the post of justice minister, with a public declaration that the 
government was bedevilled with high-level corruption, was also quintessential. There was nothing 
that Saakashvili would do quietly and little that was not done with an eye to future political 
advancement. While ministers were driven in Mercedes limousines to their offices, Saakashvili 
ostentatiously walked around Tbilisi, greeting passers-by, smiling profusely, ever ready to listen 
to grievances. He realized that emotions alone would not catapult him to power; he had to build a 
national organization.71 Unlike most politicians who saw elite bargaining as the way to secure 
positions, Saakashvili set about touring the country, meeting people, building up an organization 
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and making as much direct contact with the people as possible. This strategy quickly brought 
dividends when the National Movement took a quarter of the vote in Tbilisi’s 2002 local 
elections, resulting in Saakashvili’s election as chairman of Tbilisi city council (sakrebulo). The 
victory was all the sweeter as it coincided with the annihilation of Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ 
Union of Georgia (CUG), which failed to overcome the 4 per cent threshold and thus won no 
seats, bringing a reality of sorts to the National Movement’s election slogan ‘Tbilisi without 
Shevardnadze’.72 As newly elected chair of Tbilisi city council, Saakashvili was well placed to 
increase his profile and work towards the more difficult task of ‘Georgia without Shevardnadze’. 
Again, he displayed a keen eye for ‘people politics’ and used the very limited powers at his 
disposal to launch popular initiatives that renovated apartment block elevators, built local 
stadiums for the young, and increased pensions by a symbolic amount. These initiatives provided 
ample photo opportunities and reinforced Saakashvili’s image as a ‘doer’; as one observer put it, 
the message was very much ‘Look at what I am doing with the little authority I have, and just 
imagine what I will be able to do with real power’.73
In the heady days that followed the 2003 election Saakashvili alone would not compromise or 
broker an elite deal that fell short of his maximum demands. He based his power almost 
exclusively on the crowds he could mobilize to the streets and (more significantly) whom he 
could inspire to stay throughout several cold November nights. Georgians had endured a long 
dark night of the soul, in which the whole purpose and value of independence had to be assessed 
anew. They had won sovereignty but were worse off as a result in every measurable sphere. The 
drive to vindicate the vote was as much about restoring national self-respect as about securing 
immediate individual gain.74 Saakashvili’s innovation was to abandon court politics for courting 
the people. As one of his advisors and election team managers put it:
Saakashvili appeared absolutely different from everyone else; he was the only one who 
suggested something new … Saakashvili was the first guy who refused to play these [elite 
power] games. And that gave him his originality … He was the first guy even who 
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suggested doing the door-to-door system. Let us understand that firstly we have still no 
election culture as such. For the people, the guy who appears on TV screens surrounded 
by bodyguards makes people somehow more respectful of him. Saakashvili broke this 
technology … Even on the [National Movement election] team not everybody was sure 
that it would work, there were hesitations because Georgian society is more traditional, 
maybe it would be better to strengthen his high position [with the elite] rather than to 
bring him down to the ordinary level. But it worked and now everybody is doing this.75
The decisive moment that signalled the end of Shevardnadze’s reign – the storming of parliament 
with Saakashvili in the lead. – was typical of the National Movement leader: dramatic, 
determined and high-risk. It also paid off as Saakashvili’s bold gesture dramatically upped the 
ante at a critical juncture.
In Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, there was no leader who decisively ousted President Akaev. Unlike 
Saakashvili’s storming of parliament, to this day no one can identify the personalities who forced 
their way past the Kyrgyz police and occupied the presidential palace. Speculation has centred on 
whether clan leaders or drug barons paid protesters for their trouble. What is for certain is that 
opposition leaders were not among those who attacked the White House; none had advocated 
such an assault and it was clear that they were surprised by the turn of events. The chief 
beneficiary of the Tulip revolution, Kurmanbek Bakiev, was an unlikely choice in many respects 
having been Akaev’s prime minister who presided over the Aksy killings. Azimbek Beknazarov, 
the hero of Aksy and a popular southern leader, has repeatedly claimed that Bakiev was chosen as 
nominal leader of the opposition front because he was financing protests in the southern city of 
Jalalabad and that ‘back in 2005, we nominated the man who fed protesters, no more’.76
The movement that swept Saakashvili to power in Georgia represented a break with the corrupt 
polity under Shevardnadze. Saakashvili demonstrated his intention of introducing a new ruling 
class by promoting to high positions young, Western-educated men and women. A sort of 
‘kindergarten cabinet’ developed, with the majority of cabinet members in their thirties and many 
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twenty-something junior ministers. Kyrgyzstan’s political elite, by contrast, was unmistakably 
Soviet in origin. . Although the Kyrgyz supreme court had annulled the elections on 24 March, 
the new post-Akaev leadership decided to retain the new parliament for all its faults, despite the 
expectation of the outgoing parliament and many opposition activists that free and fair elections 
would be held to produce a new legislature, the legitimacy of which would be beyond reproach. 
By keeping the parliament that Akaev had sought to fashion for his own ends, the new leadership 
avoided upsetting the incoming parliamentarians who had invested so much in winning their seats 
but, as so often in the past, exchanged liberty for stability. Far from being a child of the 
revolution, the parliament was to be the same legislature that Akaev had conceived and delivered. 
The democratic impulse was further suppressed when the two major contenders for the 
presidency, Kurmanbek Bakiev and Felix Kulov, negotiated a pact whereby they would divide the 
spoils: Bakiev would take the presidency while Kulov would be prime minister. While presented 
by supporters as a victory for democracy and inter-ethnic harmony (Bakiev’s support base was in 
the south whereas Kulov was strongest in the north), the deal deprived the electorate of a clear 
choice and made the subsequent presidential election in July 2005 more a coronation than a 
contest.
The Rose and Tulip revolutions were both remarkably bereft of a guiding ideology that 
distinguished them from the regimes they replaced. As the revolutions unfolded, and in their 
immediate aftermath, there was a rush to paint Shevardnadze and Akaev as the antithesis of the 
new leaders. But closer inspection revezals that what distinguished the new from the old rulers 
was less an ideology than an understanding that they would be more sincere and focused in 
achieving  common objectives. Many protesters in both revolutions wanted a prosperous, peaceful 
society free from war, want and corruption; in Georgia they also wanted the lost provinces back, 
and further integration into Euro-Atlantic political structures – all political values and objectives 
espoused by the ruling regime. To stress a pro-Western orientation among the new victors was to 
forget that both Shevardnadze and Akaev had been considered the most pro-Western leaders in 
their respective regions and both had initiated extensive co-operation with the US military. What 
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was offered by the Georgian opposition generally, and by Saakashvili in particular, was not new 
goals but a determined effort to achieve them. As Lincoln Mitchell has argued, the protesters’ 
main demand was for Shevardnadze’s resignation and not ‘some sweeping change in the 
country’s governing political philosophy’. The goal of securing Shevardnadze’s resignation was 
concrete and achievable, the rest ‘all apple-pie’.77 In Kyrgyzstan, too, the Tulip revolution leaders 
and organizers lacked a distinctive ideology and were a motley crew with little uniting them save 
a common will to challenge the elections. Their ranks included regional clans, urban intellectuals, 
student activists, farmers, nationalists, Russophiles, Western-orientated politicians, and civil 
society leaders. Each had his or her advocates, but there was no single leader or group that united 
these disparate interests or channelled their hopes into a coherent call for change. 
Conclusion
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan shared many structural conditions that facilitated a coloured revolution: 
an unpopular president on the verge of stepping down, electoral irregularities, a reasonably strong 
civil society complemented by opposition parties, independent media outlets, and Western 
assistance. Several factors converged to create the necessary conditions for Georgia’s Rose 
revolution. In the twilight of his political career, Shevardnadze presided over a corrupt oligarchy, 
and when opposition emerged to the rigged elections he miscalculated and underestimated the 
strength of resistance. Had Shevardnadze chosen to negotiate, he would have found willing 
partners in Zhvania and Burjanadze, and therefore it was Saakashvili, with his uncompromising 
stance and bold rhetoric, that caught the popular mood better than rival opposition leaders. Having 
patiently laid the organizational groundwork , Saakashvili provided vital energy and singularity of 
focus. At critical moments other opposition leaders vacillated and were unsure whether their
objective was to reverse the election results partially or in full, or to effect regime change and 
fundamental systemic reforms. Saakashvili’s strength, however, depended on the large crowds he 
managed to inspire and mobilize. 
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While Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip revolution may have had many of the ingredients of its Georgian or 
Ukrainian counterparts, it was half-baked. People rushed to action without having the conceptual 
ground paved; the result was minimal institutional change and rapid popular disillusionment. 
Insufficient time had been available to build a mass democratic movement, and the accusation 
sometimes levied against the Rose and Orange revolutions – that what resulted was merely a 
circulation of elites78 – carries more weight in Kyrgyzstan’s case. Cognisant of pressure from 
powerful neighbours such as Russia, China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and aware of the 
lukewarm support of distant democratic regimes, the post-Akaev government in Bishkek did little 
to move Kyrgyzstan towards liberal democratic values. What happened in Kyrgyzstan was more a 
popular revolution than a democratic one. Akaev had few supporters but the opposition party 
leaders who replaced him differed little in age, background or mentality.79 Although the key 
beneficiaries of the Tulip revolution may have been found wanting, there is reason to believe that 
civic activism is on the rise, as witnessed by the activities of the umbrella movement ‘For 
Reform’; moreover, the large demonstrations throughout 2006 and 2007 to implement key 
democratic reforms indicate that the departure of Akaev has not put most of the basic issues 
facing the Kyrgyz people to rest.80
Opposition unity prior to the revolutions has been overstated. Since these were parliamentary and 
not presidential elections, the opposition could not simply unite around a single candidate. In 
Georgia, complete national unity was momentarily achieved after the resignation of Shevardnadze 
rather than before. Saakashvili received 96 per cent of the vote in the presidential elections of 
January 2004, although as subsequent events were to demonstrate this overwhelming mandate 
was rather fragile. Kyrgyzstan not only lacked a united opposition, it was bereft of strong party 
organizations. While many opposition leaders had united on paper shortly before the Tulip 
revolution, the parties that they maintained were small and little bound them together save a 
common will to power and a desire to see  Akaev’s departure. It soon became evident that 
Kyrgyzstan’s opposition had leap-frogged to power despite a lack of preparation and having been 
denied some of the structural advantages enjoyed by their counterparts in Georgia and Ukraine. In 
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the short term, Western organizations basked in what seemed like another democratic success 
story, and in July 2005 Kurmenbek Bakiev was elected president with 89 per cent of the vote, and 
he promptly appointed Feliks Kulov as prime minister in what was trumpeted as a north–south 
unity ‘dream team’. This partnership of convenience unravelled rather quickly, and many of
Bakiev’s erstwhile allies of the Tulip revolution elections are today among his staunchest critics. 
The opposition, while not united, had reached a critical mass sufficient to discredit the elections 
and provide a focus for a disenfranchized electorate. A critical element to the success of the Rose 
revolution was popular mobilization, which added so much weight to opposition demands and 
credibility. The regional element was a crucial factor in Kyrgyzstan but not in Georgia. However, 
both Shevardnadze and Akaev secured the bulk of votes from ethnic minorities in their respective 
countries by fair means and foul. Having pillaged scarce resources for private gain, the 
Shevardnadze and Akaev regimes had but the appearance of states but little of the substance.
Neither could survive a frontal assault against state institutions, and neither could rely on state 
armed forces for protection. The unwillingness of the Shevardnadze and Akaev regimes to use 
force against protesters, partially for fear of arousing further domestic and foreign odium, was a 
basic condition for opposition success. However, the Tulip revolution diverged from its Rose and 
Orange predecessors when the capital descended into anarchy following the president’s 
capitulation. 
In an echo of the popular Soviet tactic of blaming domestic problems on foreign sabotage, the 
West in general – and the US in particular – have been accused of engineering the Rose and Tulip 
revolutions to further their interests in the region. However, notwithstanding considerable funding 
for NGOs in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan from abroad, foreign actors played a remarkably quiescent 
role during the Rose and Tulip revolutions. Funding for NGOs in the two countries was eclipsed 
by the huge sums given to the Shevardnadze and Akaev regimes since the early 1990s. Despite 
disliking Shevardnadze, Russia preferred an old familiar adversary to a new unpredictable one 
while the United States had learned to live with disappointment and never considered supporting 
Shevardnadze’s premature departure. Similarly in Kyrgyzstan, Akaev was neither loved nor 
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despised by Washington and there is no evidence that the US plotted his downfall. And while the 
Kremlin initially took the Tulip revolution as a geopolitical setback, it had learned from the 
Orange debacle in Ukraine to diversify its contacts so that the new regime did much to facilitate 
Russian interests in the region. Indeed, there is much to suggest that it was Western neglect rather 
than intervention that contributed to the revolutions by keeping unpopular autocrats in power well 
past their sell-by date. By pumping money into friendly dictatorships without calling them 
sufficiently to account, the West may have postponed revolution rather than precipitated it. 
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